The Bullitt Mission to Russia: A Forgotten Chapter of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference

Commissar: War and Peace shines light on one of the forgotten “side quests” of the Paris Peace Conference — the secretive US diplomatic mission that both succeeded and failed beyond anyone’s wildest expectations, and shaped Russia’s relationship with the West for over a century, continuing to this day.

At the end of February of 1919, just as the Peace Conference was beginning its deliberations that would go on for over a year, three members of the US delegation — a diplomat, an intelligence officer, and a journalist — were dispatched by President Wilson to leave Paris and travel to Moscow. This adventure would become known as the Bullitt Mission to Russia. So, what exactly was their mission?

To better understand their objective, we need to look at the context.

The Peace Conference 

When the Paris Peace Conference opened on January 18, 1919, there was much cause for celebration and excitement: the Great War that had lasted for over four years and claimed millions of lives could now be brought to its final conclusion. Although fighting stopped with the Armistice of November 11, 1918, it was this conference that would decide the fates of many nations. After all, four great empires now lied in ruin, and the maps of the world were about to be re-drawn.

Over thirty nations were invited to participate in the conference, and they would comprise more than fifty commissions which would deliberate on the many resolutions and treaties that would come out of this conference. Some delegations were small and some very large — with the US and Britain renting out entire hotels in central Paris to house their cadre of delegates which ranged from military and intelligence personnel to diplomats, lawyers, bankers, various subject matter experts, and the press.

World War I was over, but in the background of all the joyous celebrations and excitement about the Peace Conference, the world as a whole was hardly joyous or at peace.

First of all, the conference was taking place during the height of Spanish Flu pandemic, which had already claimed tens of millions of lives and would not fully run its course until 1920.

Additionally, the world was still ablaze with many residual conflicts. In Russia, after the 1917 revolution, a bloody civil war was now raging. There was a revolution happening in Germany, one brewing in Hungary, and another in Egypt; Ireland was at war for independence from Britain; numerous violent labor protests and strikes were flaring up across much of Europe and the US; as were also countless border expansion conflicts between some of the newly “empireless” nations of Europe including Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and others.

The Russian Question

So, given everything that was going on at that time, why a mission to Russia?

While Russia was one of the Allies for much of the Great War, it was excluded from the Peace Conference. The main reason was that the country was currently engaged in a civil war, and neither side had an internationally recognized government. And even though the new Soviet government had been in place in Moscow for over a year by that time and had diplomats and attaches in many foreign countries, it was excluded because it had signed a separate peace with Germany in 1918 (The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk) to end Russia’s involvement in World War One.

But even though Russia was not officially invited to participate in the Peace Conference, the “Russian Question” loomed large for the Allies. There were several reasons for this:

  • Throughout the early years of the war, the Russian Empire had accumulated over $3.3 billion in wartime debt, owed primarily to France, Britain, and the US. However, the Soviet (Red) government in Moscow has officially refused to pay back the debts incurred by the former Tsar and the Provisional government they overthrew. And while the White government in Omsk agreed to honor this debt, they now required even more investment from the Allies in order to defeat the Reds.
  • The vast majority of Russia’s industry and resources before the revolution were owned by foreign investments, with many of them French and British. When the Soviets nationalized all foreign-owned businesses and investments in Russia, all those investments disappeared, and the angry debtors pressed their politicians for action.
  • Finally, the Allied intervention in Russia, which began in 1917, now amassed over 250,000 Allied troops deployed across several regions in Russia to support the White armies. This ongoing engagement was becoming a drain on resources and a political quagmire. Although the Allied command believed that continued (and even expanded) engagement in Russia was needed in order to overthrow the Soviets and remediate the above debt and investment concerns, their war-weary troops at the front and civilians at home were opposed to ongoing military action after the end of World War One.

Given these concerns, although Russia was not invited to send an official delegation to Paris, the British and the French invited the representatives of the White government (which they officially supported), to be present in any deliberations pertaining to Russia. However, the Soviet government was still banned from any participation in the conference.

The President

The US President Woodrow Wilson is another important factor to consider in order to understand the Bullitt Mission. Although the US was one of the “big four” Allies in the war, Wilson did not always align with his European allies. Despite the repeated appeals from the British and the French, he resisted entering the US into the war for as long as he could. He believed the imperial governments of Europe were stalwarts of colonialism, and in his Fourteen Points peace proposal he expressly advocated for an end to colonialism and for allowing self-determination for all nations. (This proposal, although praised by nations around the world, was unpopular with the British and the French for obvious reasons).

His views on Russia were also contrary to those held by France and Britain. He believed that the Russian revolution and the ensuing civil war should be allowed to run their course. He was against the intervention, and even though he did reluctantly agree to send 13,000 US troops to Russia as part of the Allied force, he instructed his commanders to do their best to keep these troops from being used in combat against the Soviets.

And while the US, like Britain and France, also owned a significant share of Russia’s wartime debt, unlike the European Allies, the US did not have the same level of pre-war investments in Russia’s industries and resources. In fact, a considerable number of American financiers and industrialists at that time believed that it would be much more advantageous for the US if the Soviets won the civil war rather than the Whites, thus locking Britain and France out of Russia’s markets, and instead opening Russia up to contracts and investments with the US.

The Mission

Given Wilson’s distrust of the Allies’ intentions, he did his best to gather his own facts at the conference, so it was not out of character for him to send his staff on intelligence gathering missions. For example, as France and Britain made proposals for the control of the post-Ottoman Middle East, he send his own team — the King–Crane Commission — to gather information in the region. And when it came to the question of Russia, with Britain and especially France being categorically opposed to making any sort of a deal with the Soviets, he wanted to be able to make up his own mind. And for that, he needed someone to go to Moscow.

Wilson’s close advisor Edward House recommended a State Department diplomat William C. Bullitt for the mission. Bullitt at this time was running the Current Intelligence Section for the US delegation, compiling daily intelligence from the State Department, Military Intelligence, and other sources, and presenting it to the top US commissioners.

A supporter of Wilson’s Fourteen Points proposal and his liberal democratic internationalism agenda, Bullitt took to the assignment with a genuine passion. From among the American delegation, he recruited a Military Intelligence captain W. W. Pettit and a journalist and friend Lincoln Steffens to accompany him on this mission.

This journey in 1919 took almost two weeks. The commission left France on Feb 22 and traveled by sea via Finland to Petrograd, Russia, from where they took a train to Moscow.

The commission was received positively in Moscow, despite the fact that the capital was suffering starvation and diseases due to the fuel and supplies shortages caused by the war and the Allied blockade.

The commission met with Lenin, who was still recovering from the near-fatal assassination attempt in 1918. They also met with Chicherin – the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov – former Soviet Ambassador to England, and other top officials.

And this is where things took an unexpected turn. Having found the Soviet leadership to be generally amiable to a peace deal with the West, instead of simply returning to Paris to report this news, Bullitt and his team went a step further and spent several days working with the Soviet leadership to draft a proposal for a peace conference between the Allies, the Reds, and the Whites. This proposal included 7 comprehensive principles for peace, outlining proposed solutions to the major concerns of both sides including the issues of Russia’s foreign debt and of the Allied intervention on Russian soil. Bullitt and the Soviet leadership believed this to be a strong and fair proposal that would be viable with the Allies. Lenin even signed the final version, tentatively accepting this proposal on behalf of Soviet Russia, provided the Allies accepted it no later than April 10, 1919.

The Wilson administration later denied that Bullitt had authorization to conduct negotiations with the Soviets, but Bullitt probably saw his actions as simply facilitating rather than negotiating peace. In a testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, he later defended the proposal, saying it was developed to specifically address the conditions for peace with Russia he had obtained on separate occasions from Wilson, House, and the British Prime Minister Lloyd George.

Happy with the commission’s progress, Bullitt telegraphed the news to House, and his team began their journey back to Paris. Upon their return, Bullitt briefed the American Commission, and the consensus was that this proposal was worth pursuing. Bullitt’s plan was to win over the Allies one at a time — first the British and then, together, the French. He scheduled a breakfast meeting with Lloyd George on March 28 to discuss this matter. According to Bullitt, Lloyd George indicated his support for the proposal at the meeting.

However, the text of the proposal was leaked to the French and British press, and several scathing editorials caused Lloyd George to back out his supporting. The French Prime Minister Clemenceau was outraged that the US secretly negotiated with the Soviets, and Wilson, not wanting to alienate the Allies on this one matter so early in the conference, refused push it any further.

April 10 came and went, and the proposal expired.

Aftermath

Although the commission ultimately failed to change the West’s relations with Soviet Russia, this failure had significant repercussions.

For Russia, this meant that the Allied economic blockade and military intervention would continue for years to come, extending and exacerbating the already brutal civil war. The Allies continued contributing significant military aid to the White armies well into 1921, and the Allied forces did not fully withdraw from Russia until 1922. Ultimately, the Soviets won the civil war, and their distrust of the West became deeply ingrained in Russian politics and culture and is still there to this day.

As for Bullitt, he was so furious about Wilson backing down before the Allies that he publicly resigned from his position with an open letter to Wilson in which he scolded the president for so easily abandoning the key principles of the Fourteen Points including the right of nations to self-determination. Upon returning to the US, he organized a Senate committee hearing on the matter. His undying grudge against Wilson led him to later collaborate with Sigmund Freud on a psychological study of Wilson, which they published together.

Bullitt eventually returned to diplomatic work in the 1930s and became the first US ambassador to the Soviet Union, which by then had become a much more authoritarian country under Joseph Stalin.

Russia was by far not the only nation denied self-determination after World War I. The old-world imperial powers used the Paris Peace Conference to their advantage to not only retain but expand their colonies. Although many nations, encouraged by the anti-colonial and self-determinist of the Fourteen Points, sent representatives to Paris to appeal the Allied powers for independence, most returned home empty-handed and disenchanted. In a curious twist of history, one such nation was the French Indochina (which includes modern-day Vietnam), who sent a small group of representatives to Paris. They sent letters and petitioned for consideration from President Wilson and other world leaders. Their campaign for independence from the French fell on deaf ears. Among this group was a Vietnamese cook named Nguyễn Tất Thành, who, later known as Ho Chi Minh, over thirty years later would lead the North Vietnamese Army to face off against the US troops in the Vietnam War.

The Paris Peace Conference was a fascinating and historically significant final chapter of WWI. The Bullitt Mission to Russia, although ultimately a fiasco, had a profound impact on many nations.

If you would like to find out more about the Bullitt Mission, his published testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations makes for an engaging read.

Curious about other historical research used in the writing of the Commissar series? Read about the history behind Commissar.


5 Stars! Highly Recommended!

Commissar deserves a place alongside the best in early 20th century Russian historical fiction."
– Chanticleer Reviews

More history behind Commissar